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 ABSTRACT 
 
FDI-trade interlinkages have become increasingly important in a world operated by Global Value 
Chains(GVCs) and run by the Multi-National Enterprises(MNEs). The advent of a macroeconomic 
crisis, which are also more highly transmitted across countries due to these GVCs present a unique 
challenge- with an increase in uncertainty and its influence over the decisions of MNEs. The 
present study analyzes FDI and trade flows between the developing countries of BRICS and the 
developed OECD countries over the period 1986-2013, covering three macroeconomic crises. 
Focusing on the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the positive relationship between FDI and trade 
flows seem to dampen. Furthermore, this adverse impact is more severe when considering flows 
from the BRICS to OECD countries than vice-versa. However, this dampening effect is short-lived 
and becomes statistically insignificant 3 years post crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 iii 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Ishneet Kaur is currently a graduate student at the Dyson School in Cornell University. She will 
graduate in August 2017 with a Master of Science degree in Applied Economics and Management 
and a focus in International Economics. In the short term, Ms. Kaur looks forward to beginning 
work with the Risk Advanced Analytics team at McKinsey & Company which would give her an 
opportunity to utilize and further her skills in data analytics embedded in macroeconomic problem 
solving. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is dedicated to my parents and my sister for having an immense role in shaping my 
personality and my capabilities. Their unconditional support and encouragement has been a 
constant source of strength and this work is only a case in point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I’m greatly indebted to my advisor, Professor Nancy Chau. Not only has she been an incredible 
mentor, guiding and streamlining my interests into an interesting research topic; but has also been 
someone to care for my personal goals. From the very beginning, she has been a source of 
motivation and has pushed me into digging a little deeper in all aspects of life. She’s responsible 
not only for my academic acumen but for my personal development.  
I am thankful to Professor Eswar Prasad for his comments and views at each stage of the thesis 
process. He has elevated the rigor of this work and recommended exhilarating future paradigms to 
it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Section Page No.  
Biographical Sketch  iii 
Dedication  iv 
Acknowledgements  v 
Table of Contents  vi 
List of Figures  vii 
List of Tables  viii 
Body of Thesis  
• Chapter- 1  
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW  
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
V. DATA  
VI. METHODOLOGY  
VII. RESULTS  
VIII. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
X. APPENDIX  
XI. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
• Chapter – 2 
I. INTRODUCTION  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
IV. DATA  
V. METHODOLOGY  
VI. RESULTS  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
VIII. APPENDIX  
IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
1 
5 
8 
11 
13 
20 
21 
25 
27 
38 
41 
46 
49 
50 
53 
55 
57 
60 
70 
 
 vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure Caption  Page No.  
Figure 1-1: World FDI Inflows and Outflows (% GDP) 15 
Figure 1-2: FDI Net Inflows for OECD and BRICS (% GDP)  15 
Figure 1-3: FDI Net Outflows for OECD and BRICS (% GDP) 16 
Figure 1-4: Trade flows for OECD and BRICS (% GDP) 16 
Figure 1-5: FDI-Trade Sample Correlation 18 
Figure 1-6: FDI-Trade Correlation during the 2008 crisis period 18 
Figure 2-1: BRICS to OECD OFDI-Trade Correlation flattens significantly 
during the 2008 crisis period  
52 
Figure 2-2: OECD to BRICS OFDI-Trade Correlation flattens significantly 
during the 2008 crisis period 
53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Caption Page No.  
Table 1-1: FDI Determinants: Literature Review 9 
Table 1-2: Hypothesized Effect of Explanatory Variables 19 
Table 1-3: List of Countries in Sample  27 
Table 1-4: Summary Statistics  28 
Table 1-5: OLS Results – Bilateral FDI  29 
Table 1-6: IV Results – Bilateral FDI 31 
Table 1-7: GMM Results – Bilateral FDI 32 
Table 1-8: Fixed Effects Results – Bilateral FDI 32 
Table 1-9: Stationarity Tests  33 
Table 1-10: Geweke’s Decomposition – Sample  33 
Table 1-11: Geweke’s Decomposition – Crisis 2007-10  33 
Table 1-12: OLS with additional controls  34 
Table 1-13: GMM Results with additional controls 36 
Table 1-14: FE Results with additional controls 37 
Table 2-1: Literature Review  47 
Table 2-2: OLS Results: BRICS to OECD  60 
Table 2-3: IV Results: BRICS to OECD 62 
Table 2-4: GMM Results: BRICS to OECD 63 
Table 2-5: FE Results: BRICS to OECD 63 
Table 2-6: Geweke’s Granger Decomposition: BRICS to OECD  64 
Table 2-7: OLS Results: OECD to BRICS  64 
Table 2-8: IV Results: OECD to BRICS  67 
Table 2-9: GMM Results: OECD to BRICS  68 
Table 2-10: FE Results: OECD to BRICS  69 
Table 2-11: Geweke’s Granger Decomposition: OECD to BRICS  69 
 1 
 
Chapter 1  
Impact of a Macroeconomic Crisis on the FDI-Trade Nexus 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of a macroeconomic crisis on the interlinkages 
between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade flows between countries. The relationship 
between trade and FDI is the mainstay consideration as these have been important drivers of 
economic growth, technology transfer, human capital formation, and have facilitated the 
disbursement of the production process as per the comparative advantages of countries. The 
dominant role played by the Global Value Chains (GVCs) in today’s world has increased the 
intensity with which the FDI and trade flows are connected and thereupon dependent on each other. 
This paper takes episodes of macroeconomic crises under the lens because they are periods of 
uncertainty and bleak economic performance that represent a unique challenge for the 
policymakers.  
The nexus between FDI and trade flows have been crucial in the multi-national enterprise(MNE) 
shaped highly-globalized world of today. UNCTAD, 2013 report on GVCs and Development 
establishes trade and FDI flows to be inextricably intertwined due to the functioning of GVCs 
undertaken by MNEs. It also estimates that MNE-led investment in productive assets and cross-
country trade in intermediate inputs and finished outputs account for 80 percent of global trade. 
Agiomirgianakis et al. (2003) opines that FDI is regarded as the investment flows resultant of the 
behavior of MNEs. Hence, the factors that influence the behavior of MNEs may also affect the 
magnitude and the direction of FDI (Demirhan and Masca, 2008). This means that any 
macroeconomic shock is bound to change the magnitude and direction of FDI. The workings of 
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the GVCs, moreover, have impacted the magnitude and global transmission of these shocks 
(Ferrantino and Taglioni, 2014). 
The ubiquitous presence of MNEs have been possible as they face lower underlying transaction 
costs (Hennart, 2000), wherein the transaction costs refers to all the costs which are not accounted 
for in the financial price of the product or service and constitute of information, bargaining and 
policing costs, which are discussed in detail later in the paper. The paper argues that the bilateral 
trade flows between the sample countries have embedded in them these transaction costs, which 
reduce with increase in bilateral trade, thereby increasing cross-border FDI flows. And during 
macroeconomic crises, it is the rise in these transaction costs that leads to a fall in the positive 
impact of trade flows on FDI. The underlying motive of this paper is to contribute to the effort 
towards understanding the consequential mechanics of such crises on investment and trade 
relationships between countries.  
FDI is considered as the dependent variable for it has important consequences for the participating 
countries. FDI is beneficial both for the host country as well as investors. While for the host 
country, the FDI is a source of capital and resources which may not be available otherwise, and 
for the investing country as it provides an opportunity to seek the highest rate of return (Hill,2000). 
The World Bank characterizes FDI as being a cross-border investment which gives the investors 
some degree of ownership or influence in the activity of the enterprise.  The IMF regards FDI as 
an important source of external finance that is motivated by the possibility of earning long-term 
profits from enterprises residing in another country. (Kastrati, 2013) summarizes that FDI 
facilitates economic growth in host countries through the following channels:  
(a) Transfer of Resources – FDI is a source of capital, technology and managerial capacity leading 
to economic growth (Hill,2000).  
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Capital: This is crucial for developing countries, as the Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) 
may have better access than the firms in these countries due to the economic size, internal 
resources, and/or reputation. Moreover, evidence suggests that FDI is correlated with 
increasing domestic investment (Jenkins and Thomas, 2002; Borensztein, 1998).  
Technology: FDI is important for productivity and sustainable economic growth due to 
transfer of knowledge, skills and enhancement of Research and Development (R&D) efforts 
in the host countries (UNCTAD, 2010).  
Managerial capacity: Following Lall and Streeten (1977), FDI leads to more efficient 
management of operations due to better training.  
(b) Employment Generation – FDI leads to both direct and indirect increase in employment, 
wherein the direct employment refers to the increase in employment in the host enterprise and 
the indirect employment refers to increase in employment in the firms that supply supporting 
materials. Aaron (1999) estimated that FDI directly created about 26 million jobs in the 
developing world and for every direct job created, 1.6 jobs were created in the allied sectors.  
(c) Effect on the Balance of Payments (BoP) Account – There are three channels through which 
FDI affects BoP account: MNE buying a subsidiary firm leads to a one-time influx in the 
capital account of host country, if FDI has an import substitution effect, it improves the current 
account of the host country, and lastly, if the good produced by the host enterprise is exported 
and sold in other countries, then also it positively affects the current account of the host 
country.  
(d) Effect on Competition – FDI increases economic growth by raising domestic competition 
which leads to investment in newer technology and R&D, in turn leading to higher productivity 
and better prices (OECD, 2002).  
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The FDI-trade nexus created by the GVCs have spliced and spread the various stages of the 
production process across different countries, called as production fragmentation in literature, and 
this has led to increasing complementarity between cross-country FDI and trade flows (World 
Bank). This also has important implications on the effect of macroeconomic crises on trade flows 
between countries. If a commodity is produced entirely within the exporting country and there is 
a fall in demand, it leads to the disruption in this unidirectional trade flow. But if this commodity 
is produced using an imported commodity as an intermediate good, the fall in demand leads to 
disruption of these two directions of trade flows. O’Rourke, 2009 argues that since GVCs cause 
more trade, a 1 percent reduction in demand cause a 1 percent reduction in trade of both 
intermediaries and final goods. This implies that a reduction in demand for goods now impacts 
more countries operating as part of a GVC. Ferrantino and Taglioni, 2014 comment that since the 
demand for final good feeds into the demand for intermediate goods which are spread out across 
many countries mean that the demand shocks in times of economic crises are more rapidly and 
fully transmitted across countries.  
To analyze the impact of macroeconomic crises on this FDI-trade nexus, this paper focuses on the 
relationship of 36 countries – between the 31 developed OECD countries with 5 developing 
BRICS over the period 1986-2013, covering three macroeconomic crises – the Mexican Peso crisis 
of 1994-1995, the “contagion” Asian crisis leading up to Russian Ruble and Brazil crisis from 
1997-1999, and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The paper argues that due to increased 
uncertainty, the transaction costs rise during periods of crises which dampens the cross-country 
trade-FDI interlinkages. While the Mexican Peso crisis does not have a significant effect on the 
FDI-trade relationship and the Asian crisis indicates an increase in these interlinkages which are 
contradictory to the underlying assumption, the paper thereafter focuses solely on the Global 
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Financial Crisis.  
The results indicate a robust positive effect of bilateral trade on bilateral FDI flows between 
country pairs, wherein a 1 percent increase in trade leads to a 0.8 percent increase in FDI on an 
average, ceteris paribus which is significant at 1 percent level. Furthermore, not only is a 
significant bidirectional Granger causality established- running both from trade to FDI and from 
FDI to trade over the sample period, it is also augmented by significant instantaneous feedbacks 
between the FDI and trade flows. Interestingly, the 2008 crisis period displays a significant 
reduction in the impact of trade on FDI flows as a 1 percent increase in trade flows leads to an 
average increase in FDI flows by 0.60 percent, with the reduction being significant at 5 percent. 
This negative impact of the crisis period is more pronounced for the fixed effects approach- 
wherein the 1 percent increase in trade leading to a 0.26 percent increase in FDI is dwarfed by the 
negative effect of 0.32 percent due to crisis, giving an overall negative impact of 0.06 percent of 
trade on FDI during the crisis period. This result is reflected in analysis of Granger causality which 
show a break in causality running from FDI to trade during the crisis period, i.e. results indicate 
that the bilateral FDI flows do not have a significant impact on the trade flows between countries 
during the crisis period. This may be because of the relative stickiness of FDI flows which make 
the countries resort to reducing the intensity of cross-country trade relationship in periods of 
increased uncertainty and risk perception.  
II. THEORECTICAL MOTIVATION  
The theoretical foundation of this paper rests on the discussion in Hosseini,1994 which argues that 
economic theory took a long time evolving into something that could explain the motivation 
behind FDI. It sketches its history starting from the classical world of perfect competition, 
homogenous commodities and costless information wherein there was no need for prices to deviate 
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from their equilibrium or any economies of scale to be harnessed by marketing or by setting up 
globally dispersed production and distribution channels. This was followed by the Hecksher-
Ohlin-Samuelson model which postulated only trade in goods between regions and argued that the 
trade in goods would lead to an equalization in the factor prices and hence, the search for a 
theoretical backing continued.  
The first theory about transfer of capital from one place to another was that of portfolio theory, 
which explained this movement in search for higher profits, due to interest rate differentials. This 
theory however, lacked an explanation for transfer of knowledge in terms of technology or 
managerial capacity, which was one of the mainstay features of FDI. It was only after the Coase-
Williamson theory of transaction costs that the FDI flows between countries could be explained. 
Transactions costs refer to the cost incurred in an economic transaction other than the price paid 
for in the exchange, i.e. it refers to all the costs which are not accounted for in the financial price 
of the product or service. Transaction costs constitute of information, bargaining and policing costs 
(Dahlman, 1979), each of which are defined as follows:  
1.  Information costs exists due to imperfect information, which are bound to be higher across 
countries. This refers to the costs incurred for searching about the best production techniques, 
access to resources, preferences in the market, et cetra form the producers’ perspective and 
costs associated with matching preferences with the best priced product for the consumers.   
2. Bargaining and negotiation costs refer to reaching a mutually beneficial agreement between 
parties. In as much as languages and cultures differ across countries, it will increase these costs.  
3. Contract enforcement or policing costs: These refer to the costs associated with keeping the 
contract and the agreed upon conditions enforced when the formal institutions and policing 
frameworks do not exist (perfectly).  
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This theory however, had the drawback of not taking account the political uncertainties which 
were crucial in determining the direction and magnitude of FDI flows. Hosseini (1994) further 
argued that even when FDI was motivated by revenue considerations, there was an element of 
political uncertainty and the perception of risk which shaped the FDI decision. This argument, 
being an extension of transaction cost theory to incorporate risk, implied that FDI might not flow 
as per raw economic logic. Moreover, since risk perception depended on both the access to local 
information about the host country which may be inaccurate and was subjected to the receivers’ 
ability to evaluate that information for decision making with limited time, (as per Herbert, 1982), 
FDI decision could be categorized as bounded rationality (Hossieni, 1994).  
The interlinkages between FDI and trade flows could then be regarded as a consequence of 
bilateral trade relationship affecting transaction costs between countries. The body of literature 
concerning the reduction in cross-country transaction costs emphasize on “network effects” which 
are proxied by business and social connections, and information and communication technology 
shared between countries. Murat et al. (2006) conclude that “entry (in terms of FDI) is more 
difficult when countries are distant, not only geographically, but also culturally and institutionally” 
(Murat 3).  
While the trade - FDI interlinkages may be regarded as developing over the long run, they rest on 
the foundations of transaction costs, which due to the bounded rationality argument would change 
with changes in the macroeconomic variables and risk perception. It becomes imperative then to 
study the impact of crises, as a single episode of macroeconomic crisis would have a significant 
impact on uncertainty and risk perceptions, both financial and political. Moreover, when the crisis 
is global in nature and has a contagion effect, these transaction costs are bound to rise globally. 
The underlying hypothesis of the paper is that while the long run FDI-trade interlinkages would 
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imply a positive impact of trade on FDI, an episode of crisis would increase transaction costs due 
to increased uncertainty and risk and hence, would tend to lower this positive impact.  
III. LITERATURE REVIEW  
UNCTAD defined FDI as a type of cross-border investment made in order to acquire a lasting 
interest in the invested enterprise. The literature specifies a nuanced relationship between FDI and 
trade flows - while some early studies like Blonigen (1997) and Brainard (1997) emphasize the 
substitutive nature of the relationship, a body of literature like Lipsey and Weiss (1981) and 
Blomstrom et al. (1988) provide empirical evidence suggesting complementarity in the same. 
Dunning (1993) however suggests that FDI may be guided by varied motives which would 
determine the factors affecting it as well as specify its relationship with trade. It further categorizes 
FDI as market seeking, revenue seeking or efficiency seeking.   
• Market-seeking FDI refers to investment serving the local market, which is driven hence, 
primarily by the size of the market, and is categorized as horizontal FDI, which acts as a 
substitute to trade.  
• Revenue-seeking FDI is investment driven by the abundance of resources – like labor, and is 
undertaken with the motive of increasing the trade wherein the produced goods are exported 
from the host country to be sold in rest of the world. There is a complementarity between this 
type of vertical FDI and trade, which is driven by the market size of the rest of the world. 
• Efficiency-seeking FDI refers to gain in efficiency, due to economies of scale and scope of 
dispersing the production process across different countries.  
Swenson (1999) reconciles these opposing forces by considering the differences in the interplay 
between trade and foreign direct investment at the aggregate and micro level and finds that 
complementarity exists at the macro level, while a substitutive relationship exists at the industry 
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and product level. Blonigen (2005) asserts that while the FDI flows between industrial and 
developing countries represent vertical FDI, horizontal FDI is what flows between industrial 
countries. And hence, the relationship of trade flows with FDI is complementary when considering 
flows between industrial and developing countries, while it is substitutive in nature when 
considering FDI flows between industrial countries.  
The literature review is organized as follows. The papers summarizing key determinants of FDI 
presented in Table 1-1 followed by a discussion on the impact of trade and global integration on 
transactions costs and risks are used to draw implications. The purpose and contribution of this 
paper are then outlined.   
Table 1-1: FDI Determinants: Literature Review 
Direction of 
Correlation  
GDP --> FDI covariates --> FDI  globalization 
measure --> FDI  
FDI --> Trade        
Trade --> FDI  
Dependent 
Variable 
FDI net inflows as 
percentage of GDP  
Bilateral FDI stock, 
affiliate sale, cross-
border M&A 
FDI gross inflows as 
percentage of GDP  
Bilateral gross FDI as a percent 
of GDP; bilateral trade as a 
percentage of GDP  
Independent 
Variables 
growth rate of GDP per 
capita, inflation rate 
regarded as an indicator 
of stability, log of 
telephone lines per 1000 
people denoting 
infrastructure, log of labor 
cost per worker in 
manufacturing sector, 
degree of trade openness, 
a risk rating and the 
highest tax rate 
extensive list of 
covariates used in 
standard gravity 
models 
Global factors like 
average world 
interest rates, 
average world 
equity return, 
average world GDP 
per capita growth 
rate. Local factors of 
domestic 
productivity, 
expropriation risk 
and tax pressure.  
Bilateral gross FDI as a percent 
of GDP; bilateral trade as a 
percentage of GDP. Extra 
controls: G-3 growth rates, 
GDP per capita, interest rate 
spreads of home country, 
democratic rule and level of 
corruption  
Data  38 developing countries 
for the year 2000-2004.  
OECD countries for the 
year 2000; Thomsen’s 
SDC Platinum database 
on M&A 
94 countries - 74 
developing countries 
and 20 industrial 
countries over the 
period 1970-1999 
81 countries for the period 
1982-1998  
Methodology OLS in levels  Bayesian Model 
Averaging - which gives 
the impact of 
independent variable 
notwithstanding the 
model used 
OLS in levels  Geweke's decomposition 
method and Granger Causality  
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Estimated 
Impact 
1 unit increase in growth 
rate of GDP per capita 
increases FDI by 0.25 
units.  
only inclusion 
probabilities 
A 1 unit increase in 
world interest rate 
reduces FDI/GDP by 
0.13 while increase 
in world growth also 
reduces FDI/GDP by 
0.11  
Granger causality exists from 
FDI to trade (50%) and from 
trade to FDI (31%)  
Conclusion Market size, better 
infrastructure, trade 
openness and economic 
stability have positive 
impact on FDI.  
High inclusion 
probabilities for 
traditional gravity 
variables, cultural 
distance factors, 
relative labor 
endowments, and 
trade agreements. 
Variables of trade 
openness, host country 
infrastructure, 
business costs, and 
institutions have low 
inclusion probability 
 
The importance of 
global factors for 
driving FDI, both due 
to the direct effect 
of global factors on 
FDI as well as an 
indirect effect on 
local factors which 
also fed into 
affecting FDI 
Two-way feedbacks exist 
between trade and FDI flows 
and they are stronger for 
developing countries vis-à-vis 
the developed countries.  
Authors Demirhan and Masca, 
2008  
Blonigen and 
Piger,2014 
Albuqurque et al., 
2005 
Aizenman and Noy, 2006 
 
The paper considers bilateral trade flows between countries as being the main variable of interest 
due to its interconnectedness with FDI due to the ubiquitous global production and distribution 
networks undertaken by the MNEs. MNEs face lower transaction costs by internalizing non-
pecuniary externalities where the non-pecuniary externalities refer to market imperfections in 
intermediate products market (Hennart, 2000). Moreover, by turning individual market agents into 
employees, it reduces their incentive to cheat (Hennart, 2000). The role of the MNEs in creating 
the FDI-trade nexus have meant that an increase in intensity of trade relations between two 
countries is embedded with lower transaction costs. And a decrease in transaction costs lead to an 
increase in FDI (Javorcik et al., 2010; Murat et al., 2006).  
However, growing global integration, both in terms of more intensive FDI and trade relations has 
raised doubt on its benefit, especially for the developing countries in the aftermath of the 2008 
crisis. Reinhart et al. (2009) found that the capital inflows to emerging economies increased their 
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risk of financial and economic crisis. Even the demand shocks in times of economic crises are 
more rapidly and fully transmitted across countries (Ferrantino and Taglioni, 2014).  
The findings in the literature survey lead to implications and necessitates further analysis which 
are presented as follows:  
(i) Complementarity is expected between the FDI and trade flows between countries.  
(ii) The consequences of macroeconomic crises are more likely to be spread across countries, 
and hence, it would be more global in nature.  
While a positive correlation between FDI and trade is implied by the existing body of literature, 
an analysis of the impact of a macroeconomic crisis is lacking. This question is of increasing 
importance due to the ubiquitous workings of GVC. Moreover, while it is argued that MNEs lead 
to a greater transmission of supply shocks across countries, an analysis of whether this 
phenomenon leads to more temporary or permanent changes in investment and trade behavior is 
required.  
This paper studies the FDI-trade nexus over the period of 1986-2013 and analyzes whether any 
deviations exist in this relationship during periods of macroeconomic crises. Furthermore, it delves 
into whether these changes are temporary or permanent by contrasting the FDI-trade relationship 
over the sub-periods of pre-crisis with crisis and post-crisis.  
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
The basic empirical strategy being followed is to specify a Gravity model with bilateral trade flows 
being the main independent variable and bilateral FDI flows as being the dependent variable. It 
rests on foundations laid in Rose and Spiegel (2004). Gravity model for two countries `i’ and `j’ 
is estimated using the following specification:  
lnFDIijt = α ∗ lnTRADEijt + β ∗ Z’ij + θ ∗ lnG’ij + ϒ ∗ lnY’ijt + εijt             (1)  
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where country `i’ is a country from BRICS and country `j’ from OECD, the level of analysis is the 
flows between each country in BRICS with each country in OECD. FDIijt is the sum of absolute 
value of FDI inflows and absolute value of outflows between the country-pair at time ` t’, TRADEijt 
refers to the value of exports and imports between the country-pair at time `t’, Z’ij is a vector of 
indicator variables used as controls and constitutes of factors like common border, common 
language, common colonizer, whether they colonized each other, whether the country-pair 
includes a landlocked country or island economies. G’ij is a vector of geographical variables 
including the distance separating the two countries in the pair, and a measure of market size 
represented by the product of the area of the two countries. Y’ijt represents the vector for time 
dependent controls like the real GDP of country `i’, real GDP of country `j’, population for country 
`i’, and population for country `j’.  
The crises periods are modeled by introducing a dummy variable for the period of impact. The 
impact of crisis variable on the relationship between FDI and trade flows is then determined by 
adding the interactions of the dummy variable with all the explanatory variables. The basic model 
specification to analyze the impact of the dummy period is then given by:  
lnFDIijt = α ∗ lnTRADEijt + β ∗ Z’ij + θ ∗ lnG’ij + ϒ ∗ lnY’ijt + λ ∗ dummyc ∗ (1+ α ∗
 lnTRADEijt + β ∗ Z’ij + θ ∗ lnG’ij + ϒ ∗ lnY’ijt) + εij                                    (2) 
The variable dummyc takes three values as c = crises considered in the analysis: Mexican crisis, 
the Asian crisis (including the Russian ruble crisis) and the financial crisis of 2008 and the post-
2008 crisis. Hence, three dummy variables are introduced in the model with the value of unity for 
the years 1994-1995, 1997-1999, and 2007-2010 denoting the respective crisis, while it is zero for 
all other years. Likewise, the post-2008 crisis dummy is unity for the years 2011-2013 and zero 
otherwise. The variable of interest is the change in the trade coefficient which represents the 
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changing effect of trade on driving FDI flows in times of crisis. This is denoted by dummyc ∗
 lnTRADEijt with the magnitude given by λ ∗ α. A post-2008 crisis dummy is also introduced with 
a value of unity for the years 2011-2013 and zero otherwise, to compare the changes in the model 
in the pre- and post-crisis periods.  
V. DATA 
The data used in the estimation process is a panel data for 36 countries – 5 BRICS and 31 OECD 
nations spanning over the period 1986-2013. The Rose-Speigel dataset for 1986-1997 is updated 
until 2013, using country pair identification number from IMF International Financial Statistics 
(IFS). The list of countries included in the sample is presented in Table 1-3. The sample consists 
of data on FDI, trade and all other explanatory variables between OECD and BRICS, i.e. the 
sample consists of bilateral flows between each BRICS country with each OECD countries. The 
FDI flows between the partner countries is sourced from the OECD database with a lower bound 
of 1 specified on the FDI flows to minimize the bias due to missing or negative values. Moreover, 
the bilateral FDI flows is specified as the sum of the absolute values of inflows and outflows in 
USD millions. Trade flows data is taken from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), measured 
in USD millions and deflated by the US CPI, which is sourced from World Bank World 
Development Indicators database. Trade flows is also bilateral in nature, i.e. the trade flows is 
calculated as the sum of the absolute value of imports and the absolute value of exports. Data on 
GDP is also sourced from the World Bank Development Indicators database, and population data 
comes from the United Nations World Population Prospects database. The summary statistics of 
the data is presented in Table 1-4.  
Analyzing the historical trend in the data is helpful to see any large drops or structural breaks.  
represents the FDI net inflows and outflows as a percentage of GDP. The historical trends show a 
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surge in the FDI inflows and outflows during the latter half of 1990s along with two periods of 
collapse in the numbers. IMF Foreign Direct Investment Trends and Statistics, 2003 reports the 
following:  
(i) The world FDI inflows was rising at 13 percent on an average during the period 1990-
1997.  
(ii) The sudden increase in the period 1998-2000 was a result of largescale cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions.  
(iii) World FDI inflows in 2000 reached 1.5 trillion USD at its peak before collapsing to 0.7 
trillion USD in 2001, which in turn was a result of a sharp fall in the cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions among the industrial countries.  
The second period of contraction in FDI flows is during the period 2007-2009, falling from around 
1.9 trillion USD from its peak in 2007 to plateauing at around 1.2 trillion USD in 2010 
(UNCTAD,2011). This break in the trend was following a collapse in value of real estate, stock 
markets, consumer confidence, and of output triggered by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
The other periods of macroeconomic crisis in the sample, the Mexican Peso crisis of 1994-1995 
and the Asian crisis followed by the Russian Ruble crisis does not seem to have an impact on the 
global FDI flows as the FDI continued toward a rising trend. The historical trends of FDI inflows 
and outflows and trade are depicted respectively in Figure 1-2,  
Figure 1-3 and Figure 1-4.  
 
 
 
Figure 1-1: World FDI Inflows and Outflows (% GDP) 
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While the FDI inflows and outflows as a percentage of GDP for the sample countries seem to be 
volatile over the years, there is a systematic fall in the period of 2007-2010. The historical 
movements in trade as a percentage of GDP for sample countries is very gradual and shows a fall 
in the crisis period under consideration of 2007-2010.  
Figure 1-2: FDI Net Inflows for OECD and BRICS 
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Figure 1-3: FDI Net Outflows for OECD and BRICS 
Figure 1-4: Trade for OECD and BRICS 
 
The fall in the magnitude of FDI and trade flows weighted by GDP represent the impact of a 
macroeconomic exogenous shock. This shock might also affect the relationship between trade and 
FDI, which is analyzed next.  
The correlation between the two variables – pairwise bilateral FDI and Trade weighted by the 
pairwise GDP is presented in Figure 1-5. Figure 1-6 depicts the same for the 2008 crisis period. 
The visual presentation of the data can be used to derive two conclusions:   
1. Positive correlation between FDI and Trade flows: The data shows complementarity in FDI-
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Trade relationship and so an increase in trade flows is expected to increase FDI flows in the 
country-pair. Since the sample countries have different GDP, the graphical relationship is 
presented between FDI-to-GDP and trade-to-GDP over time. As the sample consists of 
bilateral flows between the developed OECD countries and the developing BRICS countries, 
the data supports the conjecture of vertical or a resource-seeking FDI.  
2. Flattening in the correlation during crisis period: Visual comparison of the diagrams in part (a) 
and (b) indicate a flattening of the relationship between the two variables in the period of crisis 
vis-à-vis the sample period. This flattening of the relationship may indicate that while trade 
has a positive impact on driving FDI flows between the partner countries, the advent of a global 
crisis like that of 2008 reduces its impact. So even though trade has a positive impact on FDI 
during the crisis period, it is significantly less positive when compared to the entire sample 
period.  
The hypothesis following these two considerations is defined as follows: There is a positive 
relationship between FDI and trade flows in the sample, denoting a vertical or a resource-seeking 
FDI, but the strength of this interlinkage is reduced for the crisis period. So, while the overall 
contribution of trade in driving trade flows is expected to be positive in the crisis period, it is 
expected to be lower than the entire sample.  
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Figure 1-5 : FDI-Trade Sample Correlation 
 
Figure 1-6: FDI-Trade Correlation during 2008 Crisis Period 
 
The graphical depiction of data represents a positive correlation between FDI and trade flows, and 
hence, a positive coefficient for trade is expected. The market size variables of Gross Domestic 
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on FDI flows. Since FDI is dependent on economic integration, countries further away from each 
other are expected to interact less. Hence, variables like distance, being landlocked or an island 
economy is expected to lessen the FDI flowing to and from countries. Moreover, countries sharing 
cultural characteristics are expected to have higher FDI flows, and so variables of a shared border, 
common language, common colonizer and whether the countries in the pair colonized each other 
are expected to have positive coefficients. The hypothesized coefficient signs and the rationale is 
presented in the following Table 1-2:  
Table 1-2: Hypothesized Effect of Explanatory Variables 
 
Dependent Variable : FDI 
Explanatory 
Variable  
Hypothesized 
Coeff Sign 
Reason  
Trade 
 
Since the sample consists of flows between developed and 
developing countries, FDI is motivated by revenue/resource 
consideration. Expected to increase trade. 
Distance  
Landlocked  
Island  
 
The geographical variables of distance, being landlocked and 
being an island economy represent being isolated from the rest 
of the world, which is expected to lead to a decrease in FDI 
inflows and outflows.  
Common border  
Common language  
Common colonizer  
Colonized each 
other  
 
Historical accidents like having a shared border, language and 
colonial experiences leads to similarities in social constructs and 
similarity in institutions and cultural fabric. This is expected to 
increase trust and understanding among countries, leading to an 
increased bilateral FDI flows.  
GDP  
Area  
 
Both GDP and geographic area spanned by the countries are 
indicators of the potential market size of the economy and hence, 
an increase in either of these factors are expected to increase 
bilateral FDI flows.  
  
+ 
  
  
  
+ 
+ 
- 
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VI. METHODOLOGY 
Various empirical methodologies along with a discussion of potential biases are utilized in 
estimating the log-linear model specified in (1) and (2) for sample and crisis sub-periods. Each 
methodology incorporates country `i’, country `j’ and year fixed effects to control for factors 
specific to any individual country and year that may bias the regression results.  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): A basic relationship between FDI and trade is estimated using 
OLS methodology. The results show a significant positive impact of the trade variable on the FDI 
flows.  
Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach: The OLS model results may be biased due to potential 
endogeneity. The bilateral trade variable may be endogenously determined due to common factors 
affecting both bilateral trade and FDI flows between the country-pairs or due to the presence of 
two-way intertemporal linkages between trade and FDI flows found in literature.  
The potential endogeneity in the model is accounted for by an attempt to instrument for the 
endogenous trade variable with the use of two instruments – the product of population of the two 
countries in the pair, and the sum of the bilateral immigration.  
Bilateral immigration is used because it facilitates bilateral trade flows through two channels – 
first, due to the preference effect as immigrants are more likely to consume goods from the home 
country giving impetus to trade, and secondly, due to the network effects which lowers the 
information cost of doing business with the partner country (Jansen et al., 2009). Population is 
used as an indicator as a measure of the market size, as more people lead to higher consumption 
and hence, a higher demand for imports. The validity of the two instruments is tested using first-
stage test, test of endogeneity using the Durbin test and Wu-Hausmann test, and a test for 
overidentification using Sargan and Basmann tests.  
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While the instruments pass these tests, the two variables of immigration and population are also 
correlated with the dependent variable, which is significant for FDI at 10 percent even after 
controlling for all other variables. These instruments therefore, are not valid as the underlying 
assumption of being uncorrelated with the dependent variable is violated. This method is therefore 
biased and causality cannot be concluded.  
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM): GMM is another approach that can be used to 
instrument the endogenous explanatory variable. The trade variable lagged by one-period is used 
as an instrument. The results show a significant positive impact of trade flows on promoting 
bilateral FDI.  
Fixed Effects (FE): Along with the country and year fixed effects, the fixed effects approach also 
controls for the individual country-pair factors which might affect the relationship. This approach 
is the most robust attempt to check the significance of trade as an explanatory variable. The results 
show a significant positive coefficient for the trade variable.  
Granger Causality: The above-mentioned models indicate a significant (negative) impact of the 
2008 crisis on the FDI-trade relationship. Predictive causality is therefore, tested using Granger 
Causality method. Trade is said to Granger cause FDI if trade and lags of trade have significant 
explanatory power even after the lags of FDI is controlled for. Moreover, Geweke’s decomposition 
of Granger causality is helpful in deconstructing the whole impact into bi-directional linear 
feedbacks between trade and FDI as well as instantaneous ones. The impact of crisis then, could 
be decomposed into the bidirectional linear impacts as well as instantaneous impact.  
VII. RESULTS  
The results obtained by estimating (1) and (2) using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
methodology are presented in Table 1-5. Column (a) represent the results taking the entire dataset, 
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column (b)-(d) represent results for the Mexican, Asian and 2008 crisis respectively, while column 
(e) show the results for the post-2008 crisis period. The results indicate that an increase in bilateral 
trade flows between the country-pair by 1 percent increases bilateral FDI flows by about 0.82 
percent, ceteris paribus and this is significant at 1 percent level. Comparing the impact of the three 
crises, the financial crisis of 2008 seems to be the only one having a significant negative effect. In 
period of Global Financial Crisis of 2008, this overall effect is reduced to 0.63 percent. In the crisis 
period, therefore, the impact of trade in driving FDI is reduced by about 30 percent and is 
significant at 5 percent level. This reduction in impact however, loses its significance after 3 years 
following the crisis marking a recovery in FDI-trade to the baseline relationship. Even while the 
other two crises in the sample period seem to be important for the countries of impact, the Mexican 
crisis does not show a significant effect at the level of analysis so considered, while the Asian 
crisis seem to have a positive impact on this relationship which contradicts the basic transaction 
theory framework. The inconsistent impacts of the two crises can be reconciled due to their being 
more regional in nature, as in the case of Mexican Crisis, and due to the absence of crisis epicenters 
from the data considered, like Indonesia, Hong Kong et cetra, as in the case for the Asian Crisis. 
Due to these considerations, all other approaches henceforth, only incorporate the dummy variable 
for the 2008 crisis.  
The OLS results however, are likely to be biased due to potential endogeneity in the model. 
Following the two-way linkages discussed in literature, an instrumental variable approach is 
utilized next. Two instruments are used to proxy for the logarithmic trade flows – logarithmic sum 
of bilateral migration between the country pair; and the logarithmic product of the population of 
the two countries. The results presented in Table 1-6 indicate the baseline coefficient of trade 
increasing to 2.1, so an increase in immigration and population by 1 percent increases FDI flows 
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by 2.1 percent. This estimation approach shows a negative effect both during crisis and post-crisis 
period but this effect is not significant. However, as noted earlier, this approach is biased given 
the correlation between instruments and the dependent variable and so there is only limited 
inference that can be drawn by these estimates.  
The bias caused due to presence of endogenous explanatory variables is also accounted for by 
utilizing the Generalized Method of Moments approach with the trade variable lagged by one 
period being used as the proxy variable, with the results given in Table 1-7. The results give a 
baseline coefficient of 1.1 which in the crisis period reduced by 0.33, which is significant at 1 
percent level. During the crisis period, then, an increase in bilateral trade by 1 percent increases 
bilateral FDI in the following period by just about 0.7 percent. This reduction in impact again gets 
restored three years following the crisis.   
Fixed effects approach is also utilized in Table 1-8 to check the robustness of the finding. The 
results indicate a baseline coefficient on the bilateral trade variable of 0.28, so an increase in trade 
by 1 percent leads to an increase in FDI by 0.28, significant at 1 percent. The impact of crisis is   
overwhelmingly negative, as during crisis trade has a negative coefficient of 0.32, which means 
that overall a 1 percent increase in trade leads to a fall in FDI by 6 percent during times of crisis.  
Granger causality is tested next. Since it assumes the underlying variables to be stationary, 
stationarity is tested and confirmed for both FDI and trade using the Fisher test based on the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The p-values for the stationarity test are given in the Table 1-9. 
The test is conducted again for crisis and non-crisis periods. The results conclude that the two 
variables of FDI and trade are stationary, for the entire sample period and when the crisis and the 
non-crisis periods are considered individually. Granger causality test conclude that bilateral trade 
Granger causes bilateral FDI as well as bilateral FDI Granger causes bilateral trade in the sample, 
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with a p-value of 0.00 for both the cases. Geweke’s decomposition in Table 1-10 and Table 1-11 
respectively, show results for the entire sample and the 2008 crisis period from 2007-2010. This 
method decomposes the total correlation between trade and FDI into bidirectional and 
instantaneous feedbacks. The results show significant linear bidirectional feedbacks from FDI to 
trade and trade to FDI during the sample period and significant instantaneous feedback between 
the two. While the feedbacks in the direction from trade to FDI retain their significance in the 
crisis period, the feedbacks running from trade to FDI do not. This implies that even though there 
was not any change in how the lags of trade affected FDI, the causal link from the lags of FDI 
stopped being an important driver for trade flows in crisis period. This may be because of the 
stickiness of FDI which makes its retrieval difficult even in times of crises whereas trade may be 
more fluid. These results may represent an increase in uncertainties and risk perceptions that 
dampens the FDI-trade interlinkages during periods of macroeconomic crises.  
VIII. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
The results obtained are checked for robustness by adding a control variable for trade openness, 
i.e. trade-to-GDP ratio for the two countries in the pair. The main findings are replicated and the 
results are presented in Table 1-12 for OLS, Table 1-13 for GMM, and Table 1-14 for fixed effects 
approach. The negative impact of crisis on the relationship remains significant at 1 percent level. 
This provides support to the argument of transaction costs rising during the crisis period which 
dampens the FDI-trade interlinkages between countries.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to establish a relationship between bilateral trade and FDI flows 
between BRICS and OECD over the period 1986-2013, and analyze whether the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008 had an impact on the underlying relationship. A following question under 
 25 
consideration was whether the crisis had a long-term implication. The paper finds that increase in 
bilateral trade flows have a positive impact on bilateral FDI flows between partner countries. This 
positive relationship is statistically significant across time periods and methodologies. The 
complementary relationship agrees with findings established in literature. It finds furthermore, that 
the 2008 crisis had a dampening impact on this relationship – an increase in trade flows still 
positively impacts FDI flows but the magnitude of this impact is reduced by about 30 percent. 
Both the complementary relationship between trade and FDI as well as the reduction of impact 
rests on transaction costs argument. An increase in bilateral trade between countries reduces the 
transaction costs which enhances FDI flows between them. An advent of a macroeconomic crisis 
raises the level of uncertainty and risk perceptions, thereby increasing the transaction costs overall, 
which in turn dampens the positive impact of trade on FDI flows. This result Geweke’s 
decomposition to Granger causality presents bi-directional Granger causality between trade and 
FDI flows in the sample period. The dampening of the relationship during the crisis period is a 
result of a break in Granger causality running from FDI to trade. The estimates however, suggest 
that the adverse impact of the crisis on FDI-trade relationship is short lived. The negative impact 
of crisis loses statistical significance 3 years after the advent.  
The paper contributes towards understanding the investment-trade interlinkages in a highly 
integrated MNE-led world, mired with increased vulnerability to macroeconomic risks. It also 
necessitates further analysis of the impact of crisis on the health of individual economies, in terms 
of GDP, balance of payments, employment base. The individual country perspective is explored 
by analyzing the relationship between trade and FDI outflows and the potentially differential 
impact of the 2008 crisis on the same, which is the focus of the next chapter.  
A future endeavor consists of taking the theoretical argument of transaction costs and analyzing 
 26 
their impact empirically. That consists of taking global measures of uncertainty and risk 
perceptions, like the VIX index in the U.S. and checking for their explanatory power. A measure 
of depth of the crisis experienced by countries, in terms of fall in output or equity value may also 
provide valuable insights.  
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X. APPENDIX 
 
Table 1-3: List of Countries in Sample 
OECD  
Australia South Korea 
Austria Luxembourg 
Belgium Netherlands 
Czech Republic New Zealand 
Denmark Norway 
Estonia Poland 
Finland Portugal 
France Slovak Republic 
Germany Slovenia 
Greece Spain 
Hungary Sweden 
Iceland Switzerland 
Ireland  
Israel BRICS 
Italy Brazil 
Japan Russia 
Turkey India 
United Kingdom China 
United States South Africa 
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Table 1-4: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
YEAR 4,340 1999.5 8.078678 1986 2013 
FDIflows 4,340 342.05 1201.61 0.00 23022.52 
Country1 4,340 332.67 318.69 111.00 964.00 
Country2 4,340 560.40 318.82 199.00 924.00 
pairid 4,340 8215.56 8571.59 794.00 32204.00 
landlocked 4,333 0.19 0.40 0 1 
island 4,333 0.13 0.34 0 1 
common 
border 
4,333 0.03 0.16 0 1 
common 
language 
4,333 0.11 0.31 0 1 
common 
colonizer 
4,333 0.01 0.11 0 1 
colonized 
each other 
4,333 0.03 0.16 0 1 
logTRADEij 3,550 15.58 2.06 7.79 21.52 
logAREAij 4,317 27.46 1.86 21.87 32.73 
logDISTANCEij 4,317 8.45 0.32 7.14 9.26 
logFDIij  2,474 17.76 2.84 6.91 23.86 
GDPij 4,340 1630000000000 5380000000000 0 121000000000000 
Pop2 4,340 529000000 511000000 32100000 1360000000 
Pop1 4,340 32400000 53900000 243180 316000000 
GDP1 4,340 1102731 2322113 0 15800000 
GDP2 4,340 1361765 1322799 0 7672448 
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  Table 1-5: OLS Results - Bilateral FDI 
  OLS1 
Sample 
period 
OLS2 
Mexican 
crisis 
(1994-95) 
OLS3 
Asian 
crisis  
(1997-99)  
OLS4 
2008 crisis 
(2007-10) 
OLS5 
Post-2008 
crisis 
(2011-13)  
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij 
  
  
  
logTRADEij 0.821*** 0.826*** 0.798*** 0.876*** 0.808***  
(6.81) (6.76) (6.75) (7.09) (6.64)   
  
  
landlocked -0.208 -0.179 -0.296 -0.458 -0.298   
(--0.37) (-0.32) (-0.53) (-0.79) (-0.52)      
  
  
island omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted   
  
  
  
  
  
common border -0.224 -1.411* 0.721 0.169 -0.371  
(-0.46) (-1.77) (-1.18) (0.32) (-0.61)      
  
  
common language 0.323 0.924*** 1.105*** 0.253 0.321  
(1.40) (2.92) (2.79) (0.91) (1.11)   
  
  
common colonizer 2.198* 2.107* 2.175* 1.209 1.218  
(1.82) (1.78) (1.85) (0.80) (1.51)   
  
  
colonized each other 0.860 0.534 0.645 0.634 0.449  
(1.97) (1.14) (0.80) (1.44) (0.95)      
  
  
logAREAij omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted   
  
  
  
  
  
logDISTANCEij -0.955*** -0.920*** -1.016*** -0.801** -0.912***  
(-2.76) (-2.65) (-2.83) (-2.33) (-2.59)      
  
  
logGDP1 0.099 -0.084 -0.079 -0.169 -0.132  
(0.35) (-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.62) (-0.48)   
  
  
logGDP2 -0.122 -0.105 -0.127 -0.128 -0.148  
(-0.45) (-0.39)  (-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.55)   
  
  
dummy 
 
omitted omitted omitted omitted   
  
  
  
  
  
 30 
TRADE* dummy 
 
-0.095 0.276* -0.245**  0.034   
(0.55) (1.97) (-2.37) (0.31)      
  
  
landlocked*dummy 
 
-0.325 -0.351 0.487** 0.321    
(-0.73) (-1.27) (2.18) (1.27)   
  
  
island*dummy 
 
0.441* 0.003 -0.390 -0.408     
(1.75) (0.01) (-1.46) (-1.52)   
  
  
common border*dummy 
 
1.330 0.522 -0.564 0.156   
(1.35) (1.02) (-1.44) (0.31)   
  
  
common language*dummy 
 
-0.642** -0.879** 0.077 0.009   
(-2.24) (-2.40) (0.36) (0.04)      
  
  
common colonizer*dummy 
 
omitted omitted 1.523*** 1.404**   
  (2.70) (2.18)      
  
  
colonized each 
other*dummy 
 
0.346 0.241 0.285 0.463   
  
(0.63) (0.38) (0.71) (0.84)   
  
  
logAREAij*dummy 
 
-0.078 -0.242*** 0.179*** 0.025   
(-0.86) (-3.35) (2.81) (0.37)      
  
  
logDISTANCEij*dummy 
 
-0.481 0.601** -0.713** -0.462   
(-1.48) (2.23) (-2.48) (-1.60)      
  
  
logGDP1*dummy 
 
0.119 -0.157 0.078 -0.034   
(0.62) (-0.94) (0.57) (-0.23)      
  
  
logGDP2*dummy 
 
0.249 0.385** -0.087 -0.042     
(1.32) (2.30) (-0.81) (-0.36)      
  
  
constant  14.494** 13.71*  15.27** 13.319* 15.17**  
(1.97) (1.87) (2.05) (1.88) (2.07)      
  
  
R-squared (%) 75.01 75.20 75.48 75.61 75.22 
N  2,461 2,461 2,461 2,461 2,461 
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Table 1-6: IV Results - Bilateral FDI 
  IV1 
Sample 
period 
IV2 
2008 crisis 
(2007-10) 
IV3 
Post-2008 
crisis  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij     
logTRADEij 2.099*** 2.087*** 2.129***  
(9.61) (2.66) (9.67)     
TRADE*d_08 
 
-0.393 -0.214   
(-1.15) (-0.45)     
constant  -90.194 -106.729** -95.575*  
(-1.51)  (-1.84) (-1.60)      
R-squared (%) 65.43 67.79 65.66 
N  1,219 1,219 1,219     
First-stage  
   
Partial R-squared 0.128 0.141 0.138 
Prob>F 0.000 
  
Eigenvalue statistic 85.204 31.371 29.244 
Endogenous Test 
   
Durbin P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wu-Hausman P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Overidentification Test 
   
Sargan P-value 0.773 0.928 0.761 
Basmann P-value 0.779 0.933 0.774 
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Table 1-7: GMM Results - Bilateral FDI 
  GMM1 
Sample period 
GMM2 
2008 crisis 
period  
(2007-10) 
GMM3 
Post-2008 
crisis period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij     
logTRADEij 1.004*** 1.069*** 1.002***  
(21.27) (20.32) (19.97)     
dummy  
 
2.707 2.624   
(0.94) (0.70)     
TRADE*d_08 
 
-0.328*** -0.115   
(-3.02) (-0.73)     
constant  -11.828*** -12.782*** -12.123***  
(-9.71) (-9.45) (-9.30)     
N  2,439 2,439 2,439 
        
 
Table 1-8: Fixed Effects Results - Bilateral FDI 
  FE1 
Sample period 
FE2 
2008 crisis 
period 
(2007-10) 
FE3 
Post-2008 
crisis period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij     
logTRADEij 0.288*** 0.264*** 0.214**  
(3.31) (3.00) (2.42)     
dummy 
 
omitted omitted     
    
TRADE*d_08 
 
-0.316*** 0.011   
(-4.34) (0.12)     
    
constant  -16.793*** 71.422*** 79.195***  
(-3.58) (3.92) (4.30)     
R-squared 54.30 56.04 55.13 
N  2,461 2,461 2,461 
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Table 1-9: Stationarity tests 
Test/Variable logFDIij logTRADEij 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 0.000 0.000 
ADF for 2008 crisis period  0.000 0.000 
ADF for before and after crisis 
period 
0.000 0.000 
 
   
Table 1-10: Geweke's 
Decomposition - Sample 
      
    
Granger Causation  Chi2 df p-value 
FDI -> Trade 8.827 2 0.012 
Trade -> FDI 79.715 2 0.000     
Instantaneous feedback Chi2 df p-value 
FDI <-> Trade 5.080 1 0.024     
Total Correlation Chi2 df p-value 
FDI, Trade 93.623 5 0.000 
        
  
Table 1-11: Geweke's Decomposition - Crisis 2007-10 
    
Granger Causation  Chi2 df p-value 
FDI -> Trade 0.178 2 0.915 
Trade -> FDI 18.714 2 0.000     
Instantaneous 
feedback 
Chi2 df p-value 
FDI <-> Trade 4.565 1 0.033     
Total Correlation Chi2 df p-value 
FDI, Trade 23.465 5 0.000 
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Table 1-12: OLS with additional controls 
  OLS1 OLS2 OLS3  
Sample 
period 
2008 crisis 
period 
(2007-10) 
Post-2008 
crisis 
(20011-
13) 
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij 
    
logTRADEij 0.797*** 0.870*** 0.808***  
(6.61) (6.98) (6.63)     
landlocked -1.248* -1.515** -1.493**   
(-1.79) (-2.20) (-2.21)        
island omitted omitted omitted     
    
common border -0.192 0.161 -0.294  
(-0.39) (0.30) (-0.48)        
common language 0.333 0.237 0.186  
(1.46) (0.85) (0.61)     
common colonizer 2.215* 1.445 1.593**  
(1.92) (0.94) (1.98)     
colonized each other 0.859** 0.795* 0.787*  
(1.97) (1.68) (1.78)        
logAREAij omitted omitted omitted     
    
logDISTANCEij -0.970*** -0.830** -0.943***  
(-2.80) (-2.41) (-2.70)        
logGDP1 0.042 -0.071 -0.025  
(0.14) (-0.24) (-0.08)     
logGDP2 0.043 -0.010 -0.036  
(0.15) (-0.04) (-0.13)     
trade-to-GDP of country1 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
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(2.77) (2.77)  (3.06)     
trade-to-GDP of country2 -0.010* -0.008* -0.011**  
(-1.92) (-1.67) (-2.04) 
 
   
dummy  
 
omitted omitted     
    
TRADE*dummy  
 
-0.301***  -0.104   
(-2.80) (-0.92)     
landlocked*dummy 
 
0.434* 0.409   
(1.85) (1.44)     
island*dummy 
 
-0.410 -0.478*   
(-1.53) (-1.91)     
common border*dummy 
 
-0.517 0.091   
(-1.23) (0.19)     
common language*dummy 
 
0.114 0.174   
(0.52) (0.65)        
common colonizer*dummy 
 
1.211* 0.912   
(1.71) (1.40)        
colonized each other*dummy 
 
0.121 0.085    
(0.31) (0.20)     
logAREAij*dummy 
 
0.172** 0.027   
(2.53) (0.29)        
logDISTANCEij*dummy 
 
-0.587** -0.184   
(-2.11) (-0.60)        
logGDP1*dummy 
 
0.137 0.108   
(1.00) (0.73)        
logGDP2*dummy 
 
-0.038 0.129   
(-0.33) (1.04)        
trade-to-GDP of 
country1*dummy 
 
-0.002 -0.003 
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(-0.82) (-1.31)     
trade-to-GDP of 
country2*dummy 
 
0.008 0.025** 
  
(1.22) (2.52)     
constant  11.01 10.76 12.54  
(1.44) (1.46) (1.62)    
 
   
R-squared (%) 75.33 75.83 75.54 
N  2,461 2,461 2,461 
        
 
 
Table 1-13: GMM Results with additional controls 
  GMM1 GMM2 GMM3  
Sample 
period 
2008 crisis 
period  
(2007-10) 
Post-2008 
crisis period 
(20011-13) 
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij     
logTRADEij 1.007*** 1.075*** 1.008***  
(21.22) (20.05) (19.98)     
dummy  
 
1.238 -0.237   
(0.34) (-0.07)     
TRADE*dummy  
 
-0.268** -0.104   
(-2.38) (-0.72)     
constant  -19.011*** -18.572*** -18.048***  
(-14.39) (-12.59) (-12.70)      
N  2,439 2,439 2,439 
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Table 1-14: FE Results with additional controls 
  FE1 FE2 FE3  
Sample period 2008 crisis 
period 
(2007-10) 
Post-2008 
crisis period 
(20011-13) 
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij     
logTRADEij 0.226*** 0.271*** 0.179**  
(2.57) (3.05) (2.00)     
dummy 
 
omitted omitted     
    
TRADE*dummy  
 
-0.369*** -0.097   
(-4.60) (-0.95)     
constant  -17.325*** -14.609*** 62.091***  
(-3.55) (-2.96) (3.26)     
R-squared 54.80 56.10 55.58 
N  2,461 2,461 2,461 
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Chapter 2  
 
Outward FDI-Trade Nexus: Did the Global Financial Crisis impacted Developing 
Countries more severely? 
 
I. INTRODUCTION   
The FDI-trade relationship examined in the last chapter showed that bilateral trade flows between 
countries increases bilateral FDI flows between them. Bilateral trade flows was concluded to be a 
driver of FDI flows as the positive enforcement remained statistically significant across 
methodologies and time periods. The strength of the FDI-trade nexus however, was seen to weaken 
during the period of 2008 crisis. It was argued that trade flows between countries reduces 
transaction costs that lead to higher cross-country FDI flows, but the increased uncertainty during 
the crisis period dampens this impact.  
The analysis discussed in the last chapter provides useful insights into the net impact of 
macroeconomic crises at the country-pair level. While this level of analysis may be helpful in 
indicating the tendencies in investment-trade behavior, it provides little information regarding the 
implication of the crisis for individual countries which the policy makers are concerned with, like 
the net outflows in FDI which may raise concerns about the balance of payments. While decreases 
in FDI outflows at the individual country level may not be atypical, a 10 percent reduction in global 
FDI outflows following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 showed the potential level of impact 
of a macroeconomic downturn (Sauvant et al., 2010). The outward FDI from the developed 
countries reduced by 17 percent - but this level of impact was varied. While the sources of major 
decline were the OECD countries, many emerging markets experienced increase in FDI outflows 
(OECD, 2014), increasing thereby their importance as sources of FDI. This variation in effect 
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along with the underpinnings of FDI-trade nexus formed by the MNEs indicates that the crises 
may also have a varied effect on this nexus. It is imperative to therefore study the relationship 
between bilateral trade and outflows of FDI, specifically net FDI outflows, which is the focus of 
this chapter. The purpose therefore is outlined as follows:  
a) Establish a relationship between trade and net FDI outflows to check whether trade enhances 
or inhibits net FDI outflows.  
b) Analyze the impact of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 on the relationship.  
c) Contrast the findings of outflows from BRICS to OECD to that from OECD to BRICS to 
analyze whether the implications of crisis along with the underlying FDI-trade relationship for 
flows from developing to developed countries differs from developed to developing country 
flows.  
The net FDI outflows is considered as the main dependent variable both for its benefits and risks 
which makes it a crucial variable to regard for the policy makers. On the positive side, outward 
FDI is a measure of global competitiveness, as it represents the ability of the firms to compete in 
the international markets (OECD, 2014). FDI outflows may have broader economic benefits and 
may lead to improvement in technological base, increase in exports, national income and better 
employment opportunities (OECD, 2006). Outward FDI from the MNEs in the emerging market 
economies grew at an enormous rate of roughly 83 percent from 2003-2008 (Sauvant et al., 2010). 
The BRIC countries have been growing in importance as sources of FDI – with outward FDI 
reaching a peak of $147 billion in 2008, constituting approximately 9 percent of world FDI 
outflows and with Russia and China ranking among the top 20 investors in that year (UNCTAD, 
2010). Moreover, the outward FDI from BRICS holds unique advantages for they are motivated 
by strategic considerations and are not merely driven by short-term profitability (UNCTAD, 2010). 
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A country-specific discussion in outward FDI is provided by Sauvant et al., 2010 as follows:  
• MNEs from Brazil have been undertaking outward FDI in oil, gas, metal, mining, cement, 
steel, food and beverages industries in line with the internationalization of Brazilian firms 
(UNCTAD, 2008).  
• Russian MNEs immensely intensified their outward FDI efforts by investing 46 billion USD 
in 2007 and 52 billion USD in 2008. Their investment has been resource-seeking, motivated 
by search for raw materials and strategic commodities.  
• Outward FDI by Indian MNEs have been focused on investing through cross-border M&A in 
the regions of U.S., Western Europe, Japan and Australia in knowledge intensive industries of 
pharmaceuticals and information technology services. In 2007, the outward FDI from India 
amounted to around USD 17 billion, with its stock amounting to USD 30 billion.  
• The outward FDI from China more than doubled from USD 23 billion in 2007 to USD 51 
billion in 2008. It has become an important investor in the resource-rich countries in Africa, 
Central Asia, and Latin America.  
Outward FDI flows is also the considered as the main dependent variable as it is accompanied by 
risks for the home country which the policymakers are trying to minimize. These include a risk of 
reduced domestic investment and a lower increase in capital stock, a shrinkage in manufacturing 
jobs as producers shift their operations overseas, what is called as “hollowing out” of parts of 
economy, and hence, a reduction in domestic employment due to job migration. There are also the 
risks involved with exchange rate fluctuations and political uncertainties (UNCTAD, 2006). The 
UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2006 specifies the following risks associated when 
developing countries becomes sources of FDI:  
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• Outward FDI may not be beneficial to the productivity of the firms: FDI has been categorized 
as asset-exploiting or asset-augmenting. While asset-exploiting gives a more immediate access 
to market, and leads to improvements in market performance; the asset-augmenting FDI is a 
strategic, resource-seeking FDI which may increase the productivity in the long run depending 
on the capability of the firm. Hence, outward FDI may fail to be beneficial in this regard.  
• Outward FDI is net financial outflows from balance of payments in the home country: This 
phenomenon, however, exists only in the initial phase and may reverse when the investment 
yield returns.  
• Outward FDI financed domestically may reduce domestic investment: It may be regarded as a 
loss of capital that could’ve been used domestically. MNEs by taking the capital oversees may 
increase the interest rates at which firms borrow, thereby reducing domestic investment.  
• Impact on employment is ambiguous: Outward FDI has both job-creating and job-substituting 
tendencies. The impact on employment in home country depends on the type of investment, 
the degree of complementarity of activities between home and host countries, and the extent 
to which the MNE imports intermediate goods from the home country.  
• Potential adverse impact on bargaining power of domestic workers: Chau and Kanbur, 2013 
shows that the productivity of the investing firm determines whether the openness to foreign 
investment is beneficial or harmful for the workers. If the least productive firms carry out the 
capital outflows, the workers experience an adverse impact; but if the most productive firms 
are more likely to carry out the capital outflows, the workers benefit.  
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 saw global outward FDI flows to significantly shrink with 
only limited recovery. While the outward FDI from the emerging market economies also 
experienced a downturn, the outward FDI flows from BRIC countries were more resilient and less 
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volatile than other countries (Andreff, 2015). In light of such considerations, the quantitative 
analysis discussed previously is undertaken again, with net FDI outflows as the main dependent 
variable. This chapter focuses first and foremost, on establishing a relationship between net FDI 
outflows and trade – to determine whether it is substitutive or complementary. This is followed by 
analyzing the impact of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 on this relationship, which goes on to 
analyze whether this impact is differential for investment flows from developing to developed 
countries than vice-versa.  
To analyze the impact of directional FDI-trade nexus from an individual country perspective, the 
data is divided into net FDI outflows from BRICS to OECD and from OECD to BRICS over the 
period 1986-2013. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 is the only macroeconomic crisis 
considered for its magnitude of impact. Results suggest that the positive relationship between 
bilateral trade flows and net FDI outflows is diluted during the period of crisis, and this is impact 
ranges between 15 to 40 percent. The dampening of this positive nexus during crisis is more severe 
when considering the FDI outflows from BRICS to OECD than vice-versa, indicating that the 
negative impact experienced due to rise in transaction costs following the crisis could affect the 
investment-trade decisions of the developing country MNEs more severely. This result is 
confirmed by using the Geweke’s Granger causality decomposition which shows that for flows 
from developing to developed countries, the crisis leads to a disruption in Granger causality; while 
for flows from developed to developing countries, the Granger causality loses significance only in 
the direction from FDI to trade flows.  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section II discusses the relevant literature review – its finds 
and implications. Section III discusses the empirical strategy followed by description of the data 
sources and preliminary graphical analysis of the data in Section IV. The various methodologies 
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followed is discussed in Section V and then the results in Section VI. Section VII concludes the 
main findings and its major policy implications.   
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature is discussed to lay a foundation to the research question asked. Some of the 
important considerations include determinants of FDI outflows from developing countries, 
whether trade is a facilitator or an inhibitor to FDI outflows, and finally the impact of 2008 crisis. 
This section begins with discussing the takeaways from the research addressing the questions being 
asked, followed by summarizing the methodology utilized and ending with discussing the 
implications for this chapter.  
Tolentino, 2010 considers the home country macroeconomic variables of trade openness, exchange 
rate and interest rates as drivers for FDI outflows. The underlying hypothesis is that lower interest 
rates leads to an increase in FDI outflows and so does an appreciation of exchange rate, by lowering 
the amount of real capital invested and by reducing the export competitiveness.  
Banga, 2008 discusses three important drivers for Outward FDI from developing countries. These 
include trade-related drivers, capability drivers and domestic factors. While the conclusion 
indicates that both exports and imports are important drivers for FDI outflows, the effect of imports 
is larger, thereby implying that higher domestic competition in the home market may be a more 
important driver for FDI outflows than a motive of expanding market access.  
Recent literature concluding a differential impact of a macroeconomic crisis include the following: 
Kali and Reyes, 2010 use a network based approach to show that for transmission of a 
macroeconomic crisis, trade can be both beneficial and harmful. The impact of the crisis is more 
spread when the epicenter country is better integrated in the global trading network, but the 
countries are also better able to dissipate the negative impact of the crisis when they are better 
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integrated. Grant, 2016 finds that the negative impact of the 2008 financial crisis spread across 
countries via two channels – proximity in trade and finance. And while bilateral trade had minor 
impact, similar in magnitude for both near and far countries, it was the financial interlinkages 
which acted as the primary channel of crisis transmission. Forbes, 2012 finds that the vulnerability 
of the countries to crisis was higher, higher the trade exposure, leveraged banking system, weaker 
the macroeconomic fundamentals and larger the international portfolio investment liabilities.  
Table 2-1: Literature Review 
Category  Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variable Data  Methodology Conclusion Authors  
Home 
country 
determinants 
of FDI 
outflows  
Real FDI 
outflows in 
USD 
million  
Trade openness - sum of 
imports and exports, 
home country interest 
rate, home country 
exchange rate 
China for the 
period 1982-
2006, and India 
over the period 
1980-2006 
Vector 
autoregressive 
modelling and 
Granger 
causality 
Changes in the 
level of FDI 
outflows were not 
Granger caused 
by changes in the 
macroeconomic 
factors 
considered. FDI 
outflows were 
highly 
autoregressive.  
Tolentino, 
2010. 
Trade as a 
driver of FDI 
outflows  
Outward 
FDI  
Trade related drivers - 
exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP, 
membership in regional 
trade agreements and 
number of bilateral 
agreements signed; 
capability related 
drivers - inward FDI, 
education, cost of 
capital; and domestic 
factors- GDP, wages, 
rate of unionization, 
infrastructure, tax on 
profits 
13 developing 
countries from 
East, South and 
South East Asia 
over the period 
1980-2002  
Fixed effects 
and random 
effects model 
Trade related 
drivers of exports-
to-GDP and 
imports-to-GDP 
significantly 
increase outward 
FDI. Other 
important drivers 
include inward 
FDI and secondary 
education 
enrolment rate.  
Banga, 
2008. 
Transmission 
of crisis  
Deviation 
in average 
stock 
market 
return 
Network indicator for 
epicenter country and 
the partner country, 
macroeconomic 
variables of bank 
reserves to asset ratio, 
inflation rate, GDP 
growth rate, trade-to-
GDP 
182 countries 
over the period 
1992-2000 
Network 
approach is 
used to 
develop global 
trading 
system via 
international 
trade linkages 
The impact of 
crisis (calculated 
by return in the 
stock market) is 
more intense if 
country is more 
integrated with 
the epicenter 
country.  
Kali and 
Reyes, 
2010.  
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Equity 
returns  
Change in commodity-
price index, TED spread, 
change in the long-term 
U.S. interest rates 
48 countries over 
the period 1980-
2012 
Correlation, 
extreme-value 
analysis, 
conditional 
probability 
regression 
model  
Countries have 
become more 
inter-dependent 
over time and are 
more likely to 
experience 
extreme negative 
returns 
simultaneously.  
Forbes, 
2012. 
 
While the effect of bilateral trade on FDI outflows based on the literature is inconclusive, with 
Banga (2008) finding a positive effect and Tolentino (2010) not finding any significant impact, 
the discussion on impact of a crisis has similar conclusions. The contradictory findings could be a 
result of the data sample considered, which in case of Banga is outward flows from 13 developing 
countries, while Tolentino only takes outflows from India and China into consideration. The 
discussed research implies that the negative impact of the 2008 crisis would be more pronounced 
for countries which are more highly integrated with trade and financial linkages to the epicenters 
and have weaker macroeconomic fundamentals. While helpful, this literature does not directly 
help in forming a hypothesis regarding flows between the developing countries of BRICS and the 
developed OECD as trade and financial linkages are considered only as transmission channels for 
crisis. Moreover, notwithstanding the existence of higher transaction costs in developing countries 
as established in Inadomi, 2010, no literature to the knowledge of the author, exists in analyzing 
whether the changes in transaction costs following a crisis is varied between developing and 
developed countries.  
The present chapter by analyzing the differential impact of the 2008 crisis on FDI-trade nexus 
between the developing and the developed countries is a step in that direction. By contrasting the 
impact of flows from developing to developed countries with the flows from the latter to the 
former, it is an effort to evaluate the varied implications of such crisis. It tries to test the hypothesis 
that the transaction costs are not only higher for the developing countries, but the rise in transaction 
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costs during a macroeconomic crisis may also be higher for them, and the impact of the crisis 
thereby, more severe. 
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
The basic empirical strategy being followed is to specify a Gravity model with bilateral trade flows 
being the main independent variable and bilateral FDI flows as being the dependent variable. It 
rests on foundations laid in Rose and Spiegel (2004) paper outlining a gravity model for sovereign 
defaults and trade flows.  
Continuing with the model specification used in Chapter – 1, Gravity model for two countries `i’ 
and `j’ is estimated as follows:  
lnFDI(ij) t = α ∗ lnTRADEijt + β ∗ Z’ij + θ ∗ lnG’ij + ϒ ∗ lnY’ijt + εijt                            (1) 
lnFDI(ji) t = α ∗ lnTRADEijt + β ∗ Z’ij + θ ∗ lnG’ij + ϒ ∗ lnY’ijt + εijt                                              (2) 
where country `i’ is a country from BRICS and country `j’ from OECD, the analysis in equation 
(1) is the FDI outflows from each country in BRICS to each country in OECD, and in equation (2) 
is the FDI flows from each country in OECD to each country in BRICS. All other variable 
definitions remain the same: TRADEijt refers to the value of exports and imports between the 
country-pair at time `t’, Z’ij is a vector of indicator variables used as controls and constitutes of 
factors like common border, common language, common colonizer, whether they colonized each 
other, whether the country-pair includes a landlocked country or island economies. G’ij is a vector 
of geographical variables including the distance separating the two countries in the pair, and a 
measure of market size represented by the product of the area of the two countries. Y’ijt represents 
the vector for time dependent controls like the real GDP of country `i’, real GDP of country `j’, 
population for country `i’, and population for country `j’.  
The crises periods are modeled by introducing a dummy variable for the period of impact. The 
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impact of the crisis variable on the relationship between FDI outflows and bilateral trade flows is 
then determined by adding the interactions of the dummy variable with all the explanatory 
variables. The basic model specification to analyze the impact of the dummy period respectively 
for FDI flows from BRICS to OECD and then from OECD to BRICS is given by:  
lnFDI(ij) t = α ∗ lnTRADEijt + β ∗ Z’ij + θ ∗ lnG’ij + ϒ ∗ lnY’ijt + λ ∗ dummyc ∗ (1+ α ∗
 lnTRADEijt + β ∗ Z’ij + θ ∗ lnG’ij + ϒ ∗ lnY’ijt) + εij                              (3) 
lnFDI(ji) t = α ∗ lnTRADEijt + β ∗ Z’ij + θ ∗ lnG’ij + ϒ ∗ lnY’ijt + λ ∗ dummyc ∗ (1+ α ∗
 lnTRADEijt + β ∗ Z’ij + θ ∗ lnG’ij + ϒ ∗ lnY’ijt) + εij                              (4) 
The only crisis considered in the analysis is the financial crisis of 2008. Hence, a dummy variable 
dummyc is introduced in the model with the value of unity for the years 2007-2010 denoting the 
respective crisis, while it is zero for all other years. The variable of interest is the change in the 
trade coefficient which represents the changing effect of trade on driving FDI flows in times of 
crisis. This is denoted by dummyc ∗ lnTRADEijt with the magnitude given by λ ∗ α. A post-2008 
crisis dummy is also introduced with a value of unity for the years 2011-2013 and zero otherwise, 
to compare the changes in the model in the pre- and post-crisis periods.  
IV. DATA  
The data used in the estimation process is a panel data for 36 countries – 5 BRICS and 31 OECD 
nations spanning over the period 1986-2013. The Rose-Speigel dataset for 1986-1997 is updated 
until 2013, using country pair identification number from IMF International Financial Statistics 
(IFS). The sample consists of data on FDI, trade and all other explanatory variables between OECD 
and BRICS, i.e. the sample data consists of bilateral trade flows between each BRICS country with 
each OECD countries. The net FDI outflows are net FDI outflows from each BRICS country to 
each OECD country and net FDI outflows from each OECD country to each BRICS country. The 
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FDI data between the partner countries is sourced from the OECD database.  
While the general historical trend is discussed in the previous chapter, the sample data is used for 
preliminary visual analysis. The correlation between the directional FDI flows and the bilateral 
trade flows is presented in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2. The key takeaways indicated from these 
figures are as follows:  
1. Positive correlation exists between net FDI outflows and bilateral trade: The data shows 
complementarity in OFDI-Trade relationship and so an increase in trade flows is expected to 
increase net FDI outflows in the country-pair. Since the sample countries have different GDP, 
the graphical relationship is presented between FDI-to-GDP and trade-to-GDP over time. As 
the sample consists of directional flows between the developed OECD countries and the 
developing BRICS countries, the data supports the conjecture of vertical or a resource-seeking 
FDI.  
2. Flattening in the correlation during crisis period: Visual comparison of the indicate a flattening 
of the relationship between the two variables in the period of crisis vis-à-vis the sample period. 
This indicates that while trade may have a positive impact on driving FDI outflows between 
the partner countries, the advent of a global crisis like that of 2008 significantly reduces its 
impact.  
3. The flattening of correlation during crisis period is more pronounced in the case of FDI 
outflows from BRICS to OECD: Comparison of the graphic correlation between the sample 
and crisis period in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 shows that the flattening is more significant 
when considering the net FDI outflows from BRICS to OECD countries, wherein the 
correlation almost seems to disappear during the crisis period. This implies that the reduction 
in the positive impact of bilateral trade flows is more severe when considering the net FDI 
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outflows from BRICS to OECD countries, indicating that the FDI-trade nexus may be more 
volatile for the MNEs from BRICS countries. Following the transaction costs argument then, 
the looming uncertainties that accompany a macroeconomic crisis may have a more severe 
impact on the economic decisions made by the MNEs from the developing BRICS countries.  
The preliminary data analysis can therefore be used to form the following hypothesis: There is a 
positive correlation between bilateral trade flows and the net FDI outflows. During times of 
increased uncertainty, as during a macroeconomic crisis, there is a reduction in this positive trade-
FDI relationship and this reduction may be more severe for the developing countries of BRICS 
vis-à-vis the OECD countries.  
  
  
Figure 2-1: BRICS to OECD OFDI-Trade Correlation flattens significantly during the 2008 crisis 
period  
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The expected signs for the other explanatory variables follow as discussed in Chapter – 1.  
V. METHODOLOGY  
Various empirical methodologies along with a discussion of potential biases are utilized in 
estimating the log-linear models specified in (1) and (2) for sample and in (3) and (4) for crisis 
sub-periods. Each methodology incorporates country `i’ from BRICS, country `j’ from OECD and 
year fixed effects to control for factors specific to any individual country and year that may bias 
the regression results.  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): A basic relationship between net FDI outflows and trade is 
estimated using OLS methodology. The results show a significant positive impact of the trade 
variable on the FDI flows.  
Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach: The OLS model results may be biased due to potential 
endogeneity. The bilateral trade variable may be endogenously determined due to common factors 
affecting both bilateral trade and FDI flows between the country-pairs or due to the presence of 
two-way intertemporal linkages between trade and FDI flows found in literature.  
The potential endogeneity in the model is accounted for by attempting to instrument for the 
Figure 2-2: OECD to BRICS OFDI – Trade Correlation flattens significantly during the 2008 crisis 
period  
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endogenous trade variable with the use of two instruments – the product of population of the two 
countries in the pair, and the sum of the bilateral immigration.  
Bilateral immigration is used because it facilitates bilateral trade flows through two channels – 
first, due to the preference effect as immigrants are more likely to consume goods from the home 
country giving impetus to trade, and secondly, due to the network effects which lowers the 
information cost of doing business with the partner country (Jansen et al., 2009). Population is 
used as an indicator as a measure of the market size, as more people lead to higher consumption 
and hence, a higher demand for imports. The validity of the two instruments is confirmed using 
first-stage test, test of endogeneity using the Durbin test and Wu-Hausmann test, and a test for 
overidentification using Sargan and Basmann tests.  
While the instruments pass these tests, the two variables of immigration and population are also 
correlated with the dependent variable. These instruments therefore, are not valid as the underlying 
assumption of being uncorrelated with the dependent variable is violated. This method is therefore 
biased and causality cannot be concluded.  
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM): GMM is a widely-used approach that is used to 
instrument for the endogenous explanatory variable with its lagged values. Since trade at time `t’ 
is likely to be correlated with trade in lagged values, this approach is useful. The trade variable 
lagged by one-period is used as an instrument.  
Fixed Effects (FE): Along with the country and year fixed effects, the fixed effects approach also 
controls for the individual country-pair factors which might affect the relationship. This approach 
is the most robust attempt to check the significance of trade as an explanatory variable.  
Granger Causality: Geweke’s decomposition of Granger causality is used to analyze the bi-
directional linkages between FDI and trade. The results from the sample period are contrasted with 
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the results from the crisis period to analyze any changes.  
VI. RESULTS  
The OLS results for equations (1) and (3) are presented in Table 2-2, with column (a) showing the 
results for the sample period, column (b) for the crisis period considered, i.e. from 2007-2010, and 
column (c) showing the estimates for the post-crisis period – from years 2011-2013. The results 
show that on an average, a 1 percent increase in bilateral trade flows increases net FDI outflows 
from BRICS to OECD partner countries by 0.63 percent ceteris paribus. During the period of the 
2008 crisis, however, there is a fall in this effect by 0.25 percent, so a 1 percent increase in bilateral 
trade during crisis period leads to a 0.4 increase in net FDI outflows.  
The OLS results for equations (2) and (4) are presented in Table 2-7, with column (a) showing the 
results for the sample period, column (b) for the crisis period considered, i.e. from 2007-2010, and 
column (c) showing the estimates for the post-crisis period – from years 2011-2013. The results 
show that an increase in bilateral trade by 1 percent increases net FDI outflows from OECD to 
BRICS partner countries by 0.93 percent, ceteris paribus. The 2008 crisis period leads to a fall in 
this positive impact by 0.15 percent, which means that during crisis period a 1 percent increase in 
trade leads to an increase in net FDI outflows by 0.78 percent.  
The regression result supports the preliminary finding that the reduction in the FDI-trade nexus 
due to crisis is more severe when considering the flows from BRICS to OECD than vice-versa. 
Even though the reduction in neither case is statistically significant, its sheer magnitude ranging 
from 15 to 30 percent, commands attention.  
The regression results are estimated next using instrumental variable approach – by using the 
product of populations of the two countries and the bilateral immigration to proxy for potentially 
endogenous trade variable. The results are presented in Table 2-3 for the directional flows from 
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BRICS to OECD countries and estimates that an increase in bilateral trade by 1 percent increases 
net FDI outflows by 1.6 percent, which during times of crisis is reduced by 0.4 percent. The 
directional results from OECD to BRICS is presented in Table 2-8 and the estimates show that a 
1 percent increase in trade leads to a rise in FDI outflows by 2.4 percent from OECD to BRICS 
countries, which is dampened by 0.045 during the crisis period. These estimates however, are 
biased due to invalidity of the instruments used.  
The biases that may arise due to the instruments being correlated with the dependent are dealt with 
using a GMM approach which uses the trade variable lagged by one period as an instrument. The 
results for the same are presented in Table 2-4 and Table 2-9, respectively for the directional flows 
from BRICS to OECD and then from OECD to BRICS. The flows from BRICS to OECD shows 
the trade variable has a baseline estimate of 1.05 in sample period which is reduced by 0.4 percent 
during crisis period, which is significant at 5 percent. The estimated impact for directional flows 
from OECD to BRICS show the trade variable has a positive impact of the order 0.97 percent, 
which is reduced by 0.28 percent during crisis period. This reduction is significant at 5 percent. 
The statistical significance of this reduction disappears during the post-crisis period.  
The fixed effects approach is undertaken next with results presented in Table 2-5 and Table 2-10. 
The results for the directional flows from BRICS to OECD show an estimated positive impact of 
0.4 percent for the bilateral trade flows during the sample period is reduced by 0.35 during the 
crisis period. This severe reduction in the FDI-trade nexus is significant at 1 percent, which 
disappears in the post-crisis period. The results for the directional flows from OECD to BRICS 
show a positive impact of trade of the order of 0.44 percent in sample period. This is reduced by 
0.18 during crisis period, with the reduction being significant at 1 percent and disappearing in the 
post-crisis period.  
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Granger causality results are presented finally in Table 2-6 for FDI flows from BRICS to OECD 
and in Table 2-11 for flows from OECD to BRICS. Results indicate that when considering FDI 
flows from BRICS to OECD countries, the only linkage that seems to matter at 10 percent 
significance level is that trade Granger causes FDI outflows but even this linkage loses 
significance during the crisis period considered. This result confirms the graphical presentation of 
the flat relationship between trade and outward FDI during the crisis period. The FDI outflows 
from OECD to BRICS, however show a strong linkage both in terms of bi-directional Granger 
causality between FDI and trade as well as instantaneous feedback significant at 1 percent level. 
The advent of crisis however renders the Granger causality in the direction from FDI to trade 
insignificant.  
These results are in line with the earlier finding that the reduction in FDI-trade nexus during a 
macroeconomic crisis is more severe for the developing countries of BRICS than for the developed 
countries of OECD.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The questions considered in the present chapter were the relationship between bilateral trade flows 
and net FDI outflows, how the strength of this relationship changes during periods of crisis and 
whether the impact of crisis was different for FDI flows from developing countries vis-à-vis the 
developed countries. The sample data of FDI flows between the BRICS and OECD over the period 
1986-2013 showed that bilateral trade flows have a strong positive effect in driving net FDI 
outflows from both developing and developed countries. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
dampened the strength of the FDI-trade relationship for both developing and developed countries 
as well. How the flows from the two sets of countries differed was the magnitude of the crisis 
impact – the correlation between trade and FDI flows seemed to reduce when considering the 
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outflows from OECD countries, the correlation between trade and FDI seemed to disappear for 
the outflows from the BRICS. This result was confirmed using various regression methodologies 
and Granger causality as the Granger causality from trade to FDI becomes statistically 
insignificant when considering the outflows from BRICS, showing a disruption in the interlinkage.  
The major policy implications based from this chapter are mainly dependent on the finding that 
bilateral trade flows enhance net outflows of FDI. Although net outflows of FDI may be beneficial 
depending on its motives and capabilities of MNEs, the risks associated with the same make it an 
important variable to keep under check. Trade integration, by driving higher FDI outflows raises 
these risks and hence, they can be regarded as the unintended consequences of trade. These include 
a potential reduction in domestic investment and a reduction in employment base at home, a 
worsening of the bargaining power of workers, and an initial adverse impact on the balance of 
payments. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 had severe repercussions – with decreases in FDI 
flows, bilateral trade flows, reduction in GDP growth rate, and reduction in employment base. The 
impact of such risks associated with the FDI outflows then naturally become more concerning for 
policy makers during the depressionary tendencies marked by periods of macroeconomic crisis. It 
is therefore necessary to form policies that would minimize these risks some of which may include 
setting a minimum wage above the subsistence wage to ensure the bare necessities of the workers 
are met, provision of education and skill development programs to meet changing labor demands. 
Moreover, the strong interlinkages between trade and FDI outflows imply that investment and 
trade policies should be made in tandem due to their strong feedback mechanisms.  
The present chapter necessitates future work focusing on the impact of a macroeconomic crisis on 
developing countries. A dataset spanning a larger set of countries analyzing the FDI-trade 
interlinkages and the differential impact of crisis on the least developed countries, the transition 
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economies and the emerging markets contrasted with results for developed countries may yield 
interesting results with important policy implications for crisis prevention and management. The 
experience of developing countries being more severe due to macroeconomic crises may be tested 
by splicing the impact of crisis in terms of reduction in output or equity values on country specific 
uncertainty levels.  
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VIII. APPENDIX  
(a) Net FDI Outflows: From BRICS to OECD  
Table 2-2: OLS Results: BRICS to OECD 
Directional: BRICS to OECD OLS1 
Sample 
Period 
OLS2 
2008 Crisis 
Period  
(2007-10) 
OLS3 
Post-2008 
Crisis Period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIij logFDIij   logFDIij 
    
logTRADEij 0.626*** 0.664*** 0.606***  
(4.25) (4.69) (3.63)     
landlocked -1.779** -2.374*** -2.032**    
(-2.00) (-2.75) (-2.27)       
  
island omitted omitted omitted     
    
common border -2.219*** -3.362*** -3.449***  
(-3.16) (-3.22) (-4.33)        
common language 0.159 0.505 0.284  
(0.45) (1.25) (0.51)     
common colonizer 5.144*** 5.922*** 5.652***  
(5.94) (5.17) (6.41)     
colonized each other 2.439*** 2.200*** 1.562**   
(4.66) (4.11) (2.09)     
logAREAij omitted omitted omitted     
    
logDISTANCEij -1.380*** -1.201*** -1.319***  
(-3.96) (-3.65) (-3.68)        
logGDP1 0.391 0.314 0.312  
(1.09) (0.87) (0.84)     
logGDP2 0.063 0.069 -0.075 
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(0.19) (0.21) (-0.22)     
dummy 
 
omitted omitted     
TRADE*dummy 
 
-0.246 0.132   
(-1.52) (0.71)     
landlocked*dummy 
 
1.338*** 0.278   
(3.41) (0.58)     
island*dummy 
 
-0.871 -0.693*     
(-1.37) (-1.89)        
common border*dummy 
 
1.393 1.521**    
(1.10) (2.35)     
common language*dummy 
 
-0.409 -0.140   
(-1.29) (-0.32)        
common colonizer*dummy 
 
-1.028 -0.773   
(-0.81) (-1.51)        
colonized each other*dummy 
 
0.299 0.947   
(0.49) (1.14)     
logAREAij*dummy 
 
0.382*** 0.067   
(3.03) (0.64)     
logDISTANCEij*dummy 
 
-0.782* -0.517   
(-1.68) (-1.02)        
logGDP1*dummy 
 
0.016 -0.151   
(0.07) (-0.74)        
logGDP2*dummy 
 
-0.158 0.073   
(-0.82) (0.37)     
constant  10.66 9.43 13.37  
(1.24) (1.10) (1.50)     
R-squared (%) 63.26 64.65 63.67  
N  1,207 1,207 1,207 
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Table 2-3: IV Results: BRICS to OECD 
Directional: BRICS to OECD  IV1 
Sample 
Period 
IV2 
2008 Crisis 
Period  
(2007-10) 
IV3 
Post-2008 
Crisis Period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij     
logTRADEij 1.642*** 1.632*** 1.682***  
(4.22)  (4.32) (4.34)      
dummy 
 
omitted omitted     
    
TRADE*dummy 
 
-0.474 -1.009   
(-0.64)  (-1.13)     
constant  -125.19** -148.725** -130.759**  
(-1.90)  (-2.28)  (-1.97)      
R-squared (%) 53.50 56.65  54.33  
N  639 639 639     
First-stage  
   
Partial R-squared 0.105 0.123 0.116 
Prob>F 0.000 
  
Eigenvalue statistic 34.033 7.852 9.899  
Endogenous Test 
   
Durbin P-value 0.001 0.010 0.002 
Wu-Hausman P-value 0.002 0.016 0.004 
Overidentification Test 
   
Sargan P-value 0.279 0.312 0.070 
Basmann P-value 0.304 0.355 0.094  
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Table 2-4: GMM Results: BRICS to OECD 
Directional: BRICS to OECD  GMM1 
Sample 
Period 
GMM2 
2008 Crisis 
Period  
(2007-10) 
GMM3 
Post-2008 
Crisis Period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij     
logTRADEij 1.057*** 1.094*** 1.019***  
(13.57) (12.52) (12.27)     
dummy 
 
7.707 6.594   
(1.55) (1.16)     
TRADE*dummy 
 
-0.403** -0.243   
(-2.26) (-0.99)     
constant  -12.875*** -13.915*** -12.699***  
(-6.31) (-6.46) (-5.76)      
N  1,198 1,198 1,198 
        
 
Table 2-5: FE Results: BRICS to OECD 
Directional: BRICS to OECD  FE1 
Sample 
Period 
FE2 
2008 Crisis 
Period  
(2007-10) 
FE3 
Post-2008 
Crisis Period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIij logFDIij logFDIij     
logTRADEij 0.379*** 0.405*** 0.361**  
(2.50) (2.62) (2.33)     
dummy 
 
omitted omitted     
    
TRADE*dummy 
 
-0.354*** 0.027   
(-2.71) (0.16)     
constant  -5.42 -15.94 -12.87  
(-0.73) (-0.52) (-0.41)     
R-squared 44.23 46.93 45.26 
N  1,207 1,207 1,207 
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Table 2-6: Geweke's Granger Decomposition: BRICS to OECD 
Granger Causation: BRICS to 
OECD 
Sample 
Period 
Crisis Period 
2007-10 
   
FDI --> Trade  0.949 0.279 
Trade --> FDI  0.083 0.347 
   
Instantaneous feedback 0.119 0.068 
   
Total Correlation  0.185 0.156 
      
 
Table 2-7: OLS Results: OECD to BRICS 
Directional: OECD to BRICS  OLS1 
Sample 
Period 
OLS2 
2008 Crisis 
Period  
(2007-10) 
OLS3 
Post-2008 
Crisis 
Period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIji logFDIji logFDIji 
    
logTRADEij 0.937*** 0.971*** 0.944***  
(6.46) (6.62) (6.39)     
landlocked -0.397 -0.459 -0.473  
(-0.52) (-0.62) (-0.62)        
island omitted omitted omitted     
    
common border 0.096 0.974* 0.414  
(0.19) (1.71) (0.62)     
common language 0.571** 0.601** 0.828**   
(2.42) (2.26) (2.46)     
common colonizer 0.143 -1.775 -0.489  
(0.14) (-1.28) (-0.85)        
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colonized each other 0.281 -0.019 0.049  
(0.61) (-0.04) (0.09)     
logAREAij omitted omitted omitted     
    
logDISTANCEij -0.961*** -0.832** -0.895***   
(-2.69) (-2.35) (-2.51)        
logGDP1 -0.487 -0.532* -0.542*    
(-1.54) (-1.74) (-1.71)        
logGDP2 -0.277 -0.278 -0.335  
(-0.94) (-0.97) (-1.12)        
dummy 
 
omitted omitted     
TRADE*dummy  
 
-0.156 -0.101   
(-1.14) (-0.76)      
landlocked*dummy 
 
0.283 0.243   
(1.14) (0.85)     
island*dummy 
 
-0.114 -0.231   
(-0.38) (-0.97)        
common border*dummy 
 
-1.151*** -0.363   
(-3.22) (-0.70)        
common language*dummy 
 
-0.057 -0.296   
(-0.28) (-1.01)        
common colonizer*dummy 
 
2.851*** 0.893   
(4.08) (0.81)     
colonized each other*dummy 
 
0.413 0.268   
(1.23) (0.66)     
logAREAij*dummy 
 
0.133** -0.015   
(1.93) (-0.20)        
logDISTANCEij*dummy 
 
-0.615** -0.538*    
(-2.14) (-1.82)        
 66 
logGDP1*dummy 
 
0.042 0.112   
(0.24) (0.76)     
logGDP2*dummy 
 
-0.103 0.130   
(-0.77) (0.85)     
constant  20.71*** 19.09*** 20.99***   
(2.57) (2.49) (2.64)     
R-squared (%) 76.43 76.79 76.50 
N  1,919 1,919 1,919 
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Table 2-8: IV Results: OECD to BRICS 
Directional: OECD to BRICS  IV1 
Sample 
Period 
IV2 
2008 
Crisis 
Period  
(2007-10) 
IV3 
Post-2008 
Crisis 
Period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIji logFDIji logFDIji 
    
logTRADEij 2.427*** 2.366*** 2.462***  
(8.54)  (8.22) (8.41)      
dummy 
 
omitted omitted     
TRADE*dummy 
 
-0.045 -0.341   
(-0.09)  (-0.50)     
constant  56.49 53.38 49.826  
(0.91)  (0.88)  (0.81)     
R-squared (%) 63.83 65.35 64.26 
N  965 965 965     
First-stage  
   
Partial R-squared 0.111 0.123 0.112 
Prob>F 0.000 
  
Eigenvalue statistic 56.35 18.44 17.78 
Endogenous Test 
   
Durbin P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wu-Hausman P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Overidentification Test 
   
Sargan P-value 0.755  0.861 0.433 
Basmann P-value 0.763 0.871 0.462 
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Table 2-9: GMM Results: OECD to BRICS 
Directional: OECD to BRICS  GMM1 
Sample 
Period 
GMM2 
2008 Crisis 
Period  
(2007-10) 
GMM3 
Post-2008 
Crisis Period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIji logFDIji logFDIji     
logTRADEij 0.969*** 1.026*** 0.997***  
(16.95)  (15.96)  (16.52)     
dummy 
 
3.942 0.345   
(1.23)  (0.08)     
TRADE*dummy 
 
-0.284** -0.268   
(-2.07) (-1.30)     
constant  -11.31*** -12.38*** -11.53***  
(-8.87) (-8.93) (-8.42)     
N  1,904 1,904 1,904 
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Table 2-10: FE Results: OECD to BRICS 
Directional: OECD to BRICS  FE1 
Sample 
Period 
FE2 
2008 Crisis 
Period  
(2007-10) 
FE3 
Post-2008 
Crisis Period  
(2011-13)  
  logFDIji logFDIji logFDIji     
logTRADEij 0.441*** 0.419*** 0.437***  
(4.35) (4.07) (4.25)     
dummy 
 
omitted omitted     
    
TRADE*dummy 
 
-0.184** -0.168   
(-2.23) (-1.50)     
constant  -15.39*** 19.67 21.30  
(-2.87) (0.92) (0.98)     
R-squared 57.23 58.03 57.47 
N  1,919 1,919 1,919 
        
 
Table 2-11: Geweke's Granger Decomposition: OECD to BRICS 
Granger Causation: OECD to 
BRICS  
Sample 
Period 
Crisis Period 
2007-10 
   
FDI --> Trade  0.009 0.749 
Trade --> FDI  0.000 0.000 
   
Instantaneous feedback 0.000 0.000 
   
Total Correlation  0.000 0.000 
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